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HAWAIIAN QUESTION.

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SPEECH

OF

HON. FRANCIS G. NEWLANDS,
OF NEVADA,

IN THE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

25-10
5-350
JUNE 3, 1898.

WASHINGTON.

1898.

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Mr. W. A. Smith

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Hawaiian Annexation—Territorial Expansion.

SPEECH

OF

HON. FRANCIS G. NEWLANDS.

The House having under consideration the joint resolution (H. Res. 259) to provide for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States—

Mr. NEWLANDS said:

Mr. SPEAKER: I shall not enter into the question of the constitutional power invoked by the opponents of Hawaiian annexation. I shall assume that the United States has all the powers of sovereignty; that it is not to-day prepared to deny the legality or the constitutionality of the processes by which its territory has grown from 800,000 square miles to 3,600,000 square miles; that it is not prepared to-day to contest the validity of the acquisition of Florida, the acquisition of Louisiana, involving the control of the Mississippi and the Missouri valleys, the acquisition of Texas, the acquisition of New Mexico and Upper California, the acquisition of the great intermountain region between the Rockies and the Sierra Nevadas, or the acquisition of Alaska.

I shall assume that if it can acquire continental territory it can acquire insular territory. I shall assume that if it can acquire the island of Key West, off the coast of Florida, it can acquire Hawaii, off the coast of California. I shall assume that if it can acquire Alaska, 1,500 miles away by land, it can acquire Hawaii, 2,200 miles away by sea; that if it can acquire the Aleutian Islands, stretching 500 miles west of the Hawaiian, it can acquire the Hawaiian Islands, 500 miles east of the Aleutian; that if it can acquire territory by the accident of war, it can acquire it by the deliberation of peace; that if it can acquire territory by discovery, by violence, by conquest, and by treaty, it can acquire territory by gift, accepted by solemn enactment of law in which both branches of Congress and the President concur.

I take it that the question of constitutional power is foreclosed by the action of one hundred years, and that the only question to be determined is one of policy, expediency, and good judgment.

DANGERS OF TERRITORIAL EXPANSION.

We are told that avarice is the besetting sin of nations as well as of individuals; that the pathway of history is strewn with the graves of nations driven by lust of power and avarice of territory into a ruinous expansion, destructive of liberty, destructive of simplicity, destructive of morals, and destructive of virility.

We are told that to grow means danger, and that to dwarf one's growth means safety. We are told that the Hawaiian Islands mean empire, colonial expansion, centralization of power, to be followed by decentralization and destruction; that their acquisition means the beginning of the end. The accidental occupation of Manila,

involving possibly the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, accentuates alarm and creates the fear that a proposition intended only to secure territorial defense and commercial security is the stepping-stone to a policy of imperial aggrandizement.

HOW OUR COUNTRY HAS GROWN.

I shall not attempt to follow the historic parallels which the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. CLARK] has so eloquently drawn. I know nothing more deceptive than historic parallels. It is true, Mr. Speaker, that nations, like individuals, have their infancy, their manhood, their old age, and death. It is true that nations must grow and must decline. It is true that governments that have grown into empires have become extinct. It is also true that governments that have not grown into empires have become extinct.

Was expansion the cause of the death of the one and non-expansion the cause of the death of the other? If phenomenal growth is a sure sign of early decay, then the seeds of dissolution are already planted in this Government, for we have grown in one century from 800,000 to 3,600,000 square miles. Our present area is nearly five times as great as that occupied by the Republic in its infancy.

Was it desire for empire and lust of territory, or was it accident, or was it a high and benificent purpose that led to this enlargement of our territory? There was no need of additional territory to meet the requirements of our population. The entire population of to-day could be put into the thirteen original States without overcrowding them. Part of this territory was acquired by war, part by negotiation and purchase, but it must be conceded that the central idea was to rectify our boundaries, to extend our western frontier and remove European powers from possession of contiguous territory, and to separate us by oceans, gulfs, lakes, and rivers from possible enemies whose proximity would necessitate the maintenance of large military establishments as a means of defense.

And so we expanded under the conviction that our boundary on the south should be the Gulf of Mexico and the Rio Grande, on the east the Atlantic, on the west the Pacific, and on the north the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes; and later on, foreseeing that, by the process of peaceful evolution, Canada might become a part of our Union, Alaska was acquired as the only other foreign possession between our territory and the Polar Sea.

Our country was to be a great commercial union of States, bound together in such a way as to secure them from external foes and from external conditions of adversity. There were to be no custom-houses at boundary lines to restrain interstate trade; no standing armies for offense or defense against neighboring States. Relief was to be given from militarism, and the productive power of the Union was to be increased by pursuing the arts of peace.

But whilst the States were thus to be free from military contention as amongst themselves, the nation was to be made strong for defense. This involved the establishment of a scientific boundary and a territorial grant based not on lust of empire, but on patriotic determination to strengthen our defensive line and to secure the prosperity and happiness, the peace, safety, and welfare of a great people.

INSULAR EXPANSION.

Whilst these acquisitions were mainly continental and, with the exception of Alaska, contiguous, the very purpose of territorial defense necessarily involved the peaceful acquisition of islands adjacent to our coast which could be made the basis of naval or military attack, and which, in the possession of strong European powers, would constitute a constant menace to our coast.

Had our forefathers contemplated the vast territorial expansion since achieved they would doubtless have regarded the acquisition of the Bahamas and the West Indies as important. They would have realized that those islands would control access to the Gulf of Mexico and would bar the way to the Nicaragua Canal sometime to be built and owned by this country, and they would have felt that the possession of those islands by the great powers of England, Spain, and France might be as hazardous to our peaceful isolation and our commercial supremacy as the occupation of contiguous continental territory.

Could they have foreseen the growth of naval power they would have realized that foreign aggression would take the form, not so much of invasion by military force, but of naval attack on our merchant-marine engaged in the coast trade and upon our coast cities, and that such an attack could not be successfully made without convenient coaling stations such as these islands afforded. The very policy which embraced the acquisition of contiguous continental territory ought also to have embraced the acquisition of the adjacent islands, whose annexation would increase the distances between us and possible foes.

In enlarging our boundaries, one of the legitimate objects to be obtained was to secure the outposts beyond our defensive line, the possession of which by a hostile power would make its attack more effective.

The recent operations of the Spanish fleet from the Cape Verde and Canary Islands as bases, a movement which created alarm and apprehension along our entire coast, demonstrated the value in war of a naval station even so distant. It demonstrated that an attacking fleet can be more effective than a defensive fleet with a long coast line to protect, for the attacking fleet knows the point it intends to attack whilst the defensive fleet must scatter its energies along an entire coast.

It has been fortunate that our first modern experience of warfare with European powers has been with the weakest of the second-class powers—a country bankrupt in resources, corrupt in government, and inefficient in action. No pen could picture the result had Spain been a first-class naval power, with the Canary Islands, Puerto Rico, and Cuba as bases of supplies and attack.

Geographically the Bahamas and the West Indies belong to this country as a part of its defensive line, but owned, as they are, by great powers, the task of acquisition will be difficult and, with their large population of half-breed and inferior races, may be undesirable. But if these islands had only the limited population of Hawaii to-day and should be freely offered to this country as a gift, the statesman who would successfully oppose their acquisition would be execrated by posterity.

I contend, then, that the vast acquisitions made by this country have strengthened rather than weakened it; have diminished the chances and opportunities for militarism, have minimized the

chances of continental wars, have increased our capacity for defense, and have secured the development of an empire dedicated to civilization, good order, good government, and peace. I contend that the reasoning which led to these acquisitions applies to the islands near our Atlantic coast, though I admit that present conditions render their acquisition impossible and, perhaps, undesirable, and that their number makes the task of complete defensive isolation difficult.

PACIFIC COAST.

But how is it with our Pacific coast? Can we secure there advantages regarding the possession of adjacent islands which we have failed to secure on the Atlantic coast? We have there a coast line, including Alaska, twice as great as that of our Atlantic coast. Between Alaska and our States lie the British possessions. The Pacific Ocean is nearly three times as wide as the Atlantic Ocean. We already bound it on the west and north. What confronts us on the Asiatic coast? Japan, a rising military and naval power, possessing to-day a navy superior to our own, spirited, self-assertive, and aggressive.

What other powers? Russia, reaching out for the ocean, determined to obtain an outlet to increase its maritime power, England, France, and Germany all contending over the division of the Chinese Empire. On the Asiatic coast the great navies of the world will be concentrated. The contest of the future will be over the commerce of the Pacific Ocean. Are there any islands off our Pacific coast like the West Indies or the Bahamas in the possession of foreign naval powers? No; the islands of the Northern Pacific are few, not many. From San Francisco to Hongkong, a distance of 7,000 miles; from the Aleutian Islands to the Tropics, a distance of about 5,000 miles, lie the scarcely populated Hawaiian Islands—2,200 miles from San Francisco and 4,900 miles from Hongkong—possessing a limited soil of great fertility, unsurpassed climate, and an incomparable harbor.

These are the only islands that it would be necessary for us to acquire, for whilst they are not so near to our Pacific coast as the Bahamas and West Indies to our Atlantic coast, they are near enough to form the base of attack by a hostile power, and they are the only islands adjacent to California from which such an attack could be made. Distance is relative. Recollect that the Atlantic is much narrower than the Pacific. We might well hesitate to attempt to secure all the islands in the Atlantic Ocean near our coast because of the hopelessness of the task. We might be deterred from it by reason of the fact that the European coast itself is not so far distant as to make a successful naval attack by a European power impossible.

But recollect that the Pacific Ocean is so wide as to make a naval attack from the Asiatic coast impossible without recoaling, and the Hawaiian Islands offer the only facilities for that purpose. The Hawaiian Islands are eight in number, with a population of 109,000 people. The two existing harbors of Honolulu and Oahu are incapable of economical defense, but Pearl Harbor, 9 miles from Honolulu, is capable of being so fortified at small expense as to defy the navies of the world without the aid of a supporting navy. It is a large lagoon, landlocked, except on the ocean side, to which access is barred by a coral reef through which a drift can be easily made.

When made, the harbor could float the navies of the world, and yet the narrow approach to it could be so protected by mines and fortifications as to enable it to defy the navies of the world. In its defensive capacity it resembles the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, which to-day, though protected by inferior fortifications, holds at bay our entire Navy. It could only be taken by a land attack, and the troops necessary to attack it would have to be brought nearly 5,000 miles from the Asiatic coast.

It is estimated that the expenditure of half a million dollars would adequately fortify and protect this harbor, and that a regiment of men would be a sufficient defensive force, except, perhaps, in times of war. It would be invulnerable from the sea. A land attack would be almost impossible because of the long distance by ocean to be traversed by an attacking army.

One regiment of the Regular Army, aided by a militia composed of the resident population of whites and Kanakas, could successfully resist any attacking force without other aid. General Schofield states that during our late war many Kanakas served in the Union Army and that they made excellent soldiers.

What elements of weakness, then, attach to these islands as a defensive outpost of our coast? Will Pearl Harbor require a large defensive navy? No; it can protect itself. Will a large occupying army be required? No; the resident militia, aided by a regiment of regulars will meet every requirement.

In case of attack aimed by some great power from the Asiatic coast we would send soldiers and ships to Hawaii for additional defense, but how much better to concentrate a small force there than to scatter a large force along our entire Pacific coast, to increase fortifications, to increase warships, and to prepare for the general defense of a long line of many thousand miles, leaving defenseless Hawaii to be captured by the attacking power, and used as an effective means of raiding our entire coast from the Aleutian Islands to San Diego. Admiral Walker says that we could fortify the Hawaiian Islands for less money than it would take to build one battle ship.

With Hawaii as a base, Spain, if in possession of a sufficient naval power, could destroy our merchant marine on the Pacific coast, capture our ships returning from Alaska with gold, and keep the entire coast in an agony of apprehension. Without Hawaii no naval power could aim an attack on us from the Asiatic coast, as recoaling would be difficult, if not impracticable. What navy would be guilty of the folly of starting from Hongkong for an attack upon our Pacific coast, 7,000 miles away, relying only upon colliers for additional supply? A storm might scatter them; an attacking force might sink them. Numerous contingencies might occur creating disadvantage for the attacking navy and advantage for the defensive navy. With these islands in our possession no hostile attacking force could reach our Pacific coast from the Asiatic coast, and costly military and naval protection would be unnecessary. Without these islands costly coast fortifications and a large navy would be required for coast defense.

DANGER OF OCCUPATION.

We are told that there is no danger of the occupancy of these islands by any strong power. Our answer is that they have been occupied three times in the last century by stronger powers. The Hawaiian Republic is incapable of resisting aggression. It lacks

the population and the wealth necessary to defend itself against a strong naval or military power. These islands must fall into the hands of some strong power, or else, with an increasing Japanese population, internal revolution and Japanese control are imminent.

The process of assimilation caused by an influx of Japanese might result in peaceful Japanese control. Can we afford to let these islands drift into the possession of any strong European power? Can we permit them, through the action of existing internal forces, to drift under the control of Japan, that rising power of the Orient, possessing to-day a navy superior to our own—a nation strong, self-assertive, aggressive, reaching out for power? In case Hawaii, discarded by us, is willing to seek the support of some stronger power, could we object? Such objection would be insufferable arrogance on our part after having refused their annexation.

PROTECTORATE.

We are told that a protectorate is the thing. Will any reasonable man contend that we can protect unless the people of Hawaii ask for protection? And suppose they signify their desire to be incorporated into the system of some stronger power, what becomes of our protectorate? How can we guarantee their independence if they do not wish to be independent? How can we protect them if they do not wish to be protected?

Assuming, however, that they desire to be protected, how can we incur the obligation of protecting them without the right to control their action? If we control their action, that means government—equivalent to annexation. If we do not control their action, can anyone conjecture what international complications may result from their arrogance, their indiscretion, or their aggressiveness produced by a sense of security?

SIMPLY A TERMINABLE RIGHT TO PEARL HARBOR.

But we are told that we already own Pearl Harbor and it would be better for us to fortify it and improve it as a coaling station without incurring the obligation of governing the Hawaiian Islands. Would it be wise to run the risk of having a hostile population immediately surrounding the harbor with its fortifications? The island would without doubt drift under Mongolian control. Could we rely upon their friendliness in case of war? For purely strategic purposes it would doubtless be better if Pearl Harbor were bounded by rocks without population. But are the disadvantages of acquiring the existing population of Hawaii sufficient to counterbalance the advantages gained from having a patriotic and friendly population surrounding the key to the Pacific? The disadvantages are much exaggerated. The population consists of about 20,000 whites, 30,000 Kanakas, 20,000 Chinese, 40,000 Japanese. The whites consist of Americans, English, and Portuguese, all of whom can be easily assimilated.

The Kanakas are a very kindly, intelligent race, gradually becoming extinct. The Chinese and Japanese are there, as a rule, without families, under contract. They are devoted to their own country, and intend some time returning there. The existing Mongolian population, therefore, will necessarily be withdrawn, and under wise exclusion laws there will be none to take its place. The population of Hawaii will necessarily, therefore, be increased

by emigration from our own country to islands possessing a limited but fertile soil and an incomparable climate, and thus by the peaceful processes of emigration from our own country the entire character of the population will be changed. The present population is friendly to America.

This movement had its source in the establishment of American missions in the early part of the century. It involves no wrench, no violence. As the President states it, it is a consummation, not a change. The Government is to-day practically American; the people will easily glide into our governmental system. They are now practically a part of our industrial system.

But is it true that we have any perpetual rights in Pearl Harbor? Our rights there are secured by a reciprocity treaty terminable at the will of either party. There is nothing in the language to indicate that a perpetual right is granted, and the history of the transaction shows that there was no such intention.

When the reciprocity treaty was renewed, the Senate of the United States inserted, in addition to the existing provisions for the admission of certain American products free of duty into Hawaii and the admission of certain Hawaiian products free of duty into America, a clause giving to American vessels the exclusive right to enter Pearl Harbor, and giving the United States the right to improve the harbor for such purposes.

Nothing was said as to the time or duration of the privilege, and inferentially the term of the privilege was coincident with the term of the other reciprocal privileges in the treaty, and when the Hawaiian minister, before signing it as amended wrote a letter to Secretary Bayard stating that such was his construction of the clause, that the privilege as to Pearl Harbor was terminable at the will of either party, Mr. Bayard, our Secretary of State, acquiesced in his construction.

With this history would it not be brutal in us to terminate the treaty, as is insisted by the opponents of annexation (for their real purpose is to exclude Hawaiian sugar from our country), and at the same time to claim the permanent right to the harbor? How could we justify such an act of aggression? Is any power given to us to fortify this harbor? No. Do we own a foot of territory there? No. Have we any jurisdiction over the harbor itself? No. To fortify this harbor and to land our forces there would be an invasion of Hawaiian soil. To attempt to administer our laws within the boundaries of Pearl Harbor would be practically governing a part of the islands instead of governing the whole.

It can not be taken for granted that Hawaii will give to this country her most valuable possession when we discard all the rest. The purpose of Hawaii is to obtain security, protection, peace, and good government. Can we deny all this and at the same time seize her only effective harbor of defense and hold it as our own?

ALEUTIAN ISLANDS.

Now we are met by the statement that it is unnecessary to acquire Hawaii because we have already acquired the Aleutian Islands farther to the west, as there is in these islands an admirable harbor, the name of which, I believe, is Kiska. I am not informed as to the character, importance, or value of that harbor, nor am I informed as to the feasibility of the tortuous route suggested, nor as to the condition of the currents and other

matters that oftentimes make the shortest route in distance the longest in time; but admitting all the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. DINSMORE] claims regarding it, admitting that it is nearer to go from San Francisco to the north and then to the south in order to reach Hongkong and the Philippine Islands, admitting that Kiska is an admirable harbor, I ask, Does that fact minimize the importance of securing the only other harbor in that vast expanse of ocean which can be utilized either for the purposes of war or of commerce?

And while we attach so much importance to the defensive aspect of this station, are we lightly to consider the commercial advantages involved in having the halfway station from our Pacific coast to the Orient, the halfway station from China to the future Nicaragua Canal? So I contend that as a matter of defense to our coast, as a matter of pursuing legitimately the lines which the country has so steadily pursued, of rectifying its boundaries, of securing scientific boundaries that will protect from foreign aggression and minimize the necessity of militarism, we should acquire these islands which lie adjacent to California, and that the distance makes no difference. The question is whether they are at such a distance as effectively to be used by a hostile power; and it makes no difference whether they are 100 miles from San Francisco or 2,200 miles, provided they can be so used.

As I have already said, we have seen the effectiveness of a movement inaugurated by a hostile and bankrupt country, from a base of operations 2,500 miles from our coast. How effective would Hawaii be as the base of operations of the great power of Germany or Russia in dominating our entire coast, raiding it from the Aleutian Islands to San Diego, intercepting our ships as they come down with the gold from Alaska, destroying our entire merchant marine, darting in here and there with an effectiveness that would necessitate ample military and naval defense all along the line. And here we have a long coast on the Pacific, twice as long as that on the Atlantic, and we hesitate to avail ourselves of the only harbor which, in hostile hands, would constitute a menace to our safety.

COLONIAL EXPANSION.

But we are confronted by the statement that the acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands means colonial expansion, territorial expansion, empire. I regard it as an unfortunate thing that this question is to be considered in the public mind in connection with the Philippine question. None of us know how that question is to be determined. For one I trust that it will not be so determined as to involve colonial expansion.

I do not believe in owning islands all over the globe; I do not believe in a system of colonial extension like that of England. Different nations must pursue different lines of expansion and growth. A country that is built up and overpopulated as England is must, in order to maintain its prosperity, its growth and its strength, acquire additional territory. The policy of an island limited in area like that of England, and having a population of vigorous and aggressive people should be entirely different from the policy of a country that has more territory than population, and which should be absorbed in internal problems, not external problems.

The relation which such a population as the Philippines will

have to our own, both as to individual liberty, individual representation, and industrial and commercial laws will be so perplexing as to distract us from the consideration of the grave internal problems that confront us. The acquisition of such a population may entirely break down and destroy our industrial system, based upon protection and intended to protect the American laborer from the disastrous competition of the cheap labor of other countries. Whether this is desirable or not may be a matter of contention, but that the immediate effects of it might be a most serious readjustment of industrial and economic conditions, involving distress and suffering to our existing population, must be considered.

I am therefore against colonial expansion for this country. I am for territorial defense. I should have regarded our position as stronger to-day had Dewey met the Spanish fleet in the open sea and destroyed it and then sailed to Cuba, there to unite his forces with Sampson's and Schley's. I believe in concentration of action, not diffusion of action. I believe in steadily keeping in mind the purpose with which we started, which was to drive the Spaniards from Cuba. Involved in that was the destruction of the Spanish navy wherever found, for through the Spanish navy alone could an effective defense of Cuba be made.

Dewey's brilliant victory placed Manila at his feet. He was true to the military instinct in holding his ground and taking possession of the islands as a pledge of security and peace. But the problems with reference to those islands are to be settled hereafter by wise statesmanship. It may be that we have so complicated ourselves with the insurgent chief there, with the insurgent forces that are now arrayed against Spain and are wresting from her by land the possession of her fortifications, that honor and a proper regard for the respect of mankind will demand from us the task of pacifying the islands and organizing a stable and civilized government there.

I would not have the United States unresponsive to any honorable obligation. I would even run the risk of mistakes in our foreign policy rather than do that. But these are questions for the future, serious questions, involving possible acquisition of 9,000,000 people of inferior races, not suited for our civilization, not suited for assimilation with us. Their acquisition involves not territorial defense, not peace, but aggression, conquest, war, international complications. It puts us in the theater of action of the great nations of the world and may force us to participate with them in all the diplomatic controversies that may arise.

But no such disadvantages attach to the Hawaiian Islands. The population which we add is inconsiderable. The country has already, by the peaceful process of evolution, assimilated itself with us. For years it has been practically American. American ideas, American liberty, American civilization, prevail there. No violent wrench is involved in their acquisition. No difficult problem of colonial expansion is involved in adding a population of 109,000 people, 50,000 of whom will retire to their old homes within the next five or ten years, leaving the island for the possession of the Caucasian race. No difficult problems of agricultural competition present themselves, for the soil, though rich, is limited and has probably reached its largest development.

I admit that the Philippine question is one of great difficulty. It may involve a readjustment of our entire industrial system.

We have thus far promoted commercial union between the States, done away with custom-houses between them, done away with all restraints upon friendship and commerce. We have built up around our country, by the action of both parties, the defensive wall of the tariff to protect our industries and the wage earners employed in them against the cheap labor of other countries and adverse conditions elsewhere.

If it were proposed to-day to add Japan and the Chinese Empire to the United States and to place our protective wall around them all, would New England assent? It would mean the injury and perhaps destruction of every manufacturing enterprise in that section, for the tendency, of course, is for every such enterprise to drift to the point of cheapest production.

We, in a measure, protect our laboring people against the cheap labor of Europe and also against the cheaper labor of the Mongolian races by our tariff laws; but there is not an intelligent man who does not realize to-day that the great industrial nations of the future are likely to be Japan and China, and if they were incorporated within our domain and surrounded by this tariff wall we would find our industries transplanted from our own soil to theirs.

As it is, the energies of hundreds of millions of people in China of great industrial aptness are to be loosened, and those energies are to be directed by the great powers of Europe—England, France, Germany, and Russia. We shall feel the force of their competition.

Bear in mind the change that is now going on in the cotton industry. That industry is being gradually transferred from New England to the South. Why? Because labor is cheaper in the South, because the hours of labor are longer, because there are not the same restrictions as to child labor.

We have numerous problems to meet within this tariff wall of ours, problems that involve social questions, the consolidation of capital, the consolidation of labor, the condition of the laboring classes. The time will probably come when, by a constitutional amendment, the hours of labor will be regulated in all the States by the Congress of the United States, when the question of child labor will be regulated by the laws of the United States, for the contention will be made by the laboring classes in those States subject to wise, just, and reasonable restraint as to the hours of labor that other States not subject to such restraint are absorbing their industries.

How would it be with reference to Japan and China, if those Empires were attached to us? How will it be with the Philippine Islands if they are attached to us and our industrial system is applied to them? It will be hard for us to apply the rule of justice and equality to those possessions without inflicting a serious injury on our own people.

But recollect that Hawaii has already come within the scope of our industrial system by the reciprocity treaty. Already she is a part of our industrial system. There is no wrench, no violence. This process of acquiring Hawaii is simply the peaceful process of evolution.

I think, then, with all due deference to the opinions of my friends on this side, that they should draw the distinction between an imperial policy and this question, between colonial extension and territorial defense. It will not do to oppose a just measure on the

score that it may hereafter lead to an indefensible measure. Yoke a just measure with an indefensible measure, and they may both go through. Settle the just measure now and leave the indefensible measure to be settled by time, and then you can meet it with argument alone, without its receiving the support of a just and proper measure.

I will not take up time further with reference to the importance of Hawaii as a matter of defense of our coast, nor shall I enter at any length upon the commercial advantages of the Hawaiian Islands. All that has been ably covered by the chairman of the committee and by other speakers. I simply wish to urge that the question of Hawaiian annexation and Philippine annexation should not be yoked together. I wish to urge the view that growth does not necessarily lead to decline.

We are told that the insular possessions of England are to-day her greatest weakness; that her colonies are sources of weakness rather than of strength. Imagine the history of that country had it remained content within its narrow insular boundaries. The only career that such a nation can follow is one of colonial expansion. You may say to her, "Cut off the Indies; cut off Canada; cut off your African possessions." Imagine how quickly she would die. Historians hereafter may declare that England died as a result of undue growth, of phenomenal growth, of territorial expansion; but history will also record that she lived nobly.

We wish that this country should live nobly, that it should pursue the high purposes with which it started out, the purpose of establishing within our domain as far as possible a homogeneous, independent, self-respecting people, capable of war, but inclined to peace; pursuing all the methods that will secure peace; removing from our continent by peaceful negotiations European nations whose proximity threatened continued complications; removing all restraints upon trade between these great States, and securing also such insular territory as is necessary to protect its defensive line, securing the outposts against foreign occupation, placing between this country and the great military countries vast expanses of ocean, controlling the insular outposts, and thus securing scientific boundaries, which in themselves will secure lasting peace.

[Loud applause.]

[See map, next page, and appendix.]

APPENDIX.

[Extracts from statements of General Schofield and Admiral Walker.]

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, *Tuesday, May 10, 1898.*

The Committee on Foreign Affairs this day met, Hon. R. R. HITT in the chair.

Gen. J. M. Schofield and Admiral John G. Walker appeared before the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will bear in mind that they gave informal instructions to the chairman to request the presence of General Schofield and Admiral Walker at this meeting of the committee, when resolution 259 will be before them for consideration by an order already made. Those gentlemen are present, and I will ask General Schofield if he will be kind enough to give the committee such views and information as he can as will enlighten them in the consideration of this joint resolution providing for annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States; and the reason we have sent for you was on account of the personal experience you have had on your part to some extent, and also your character as a soldier and commander of the Army for a long time.

STATEMENT OF GEN. J. M. SCHOFIELD, UNITED STATES ARMY.

General SCHOFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I presume that members of the committee are familiar with the general ideas which have been advanced for many years by military and naval men in regard to the value of the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. I will therefore be as brief as possible, so as not to repeat what has been so often said before; but first, to show the interest that we have always taken in the subject, I wish simply to recall the fact that I, in company with General Alexander, one of the most distinguished engineer officers of the Army at that time, went to the islands twenty-five years ago at our own instance, or rather we got confidential orders at our request to go there and investigate the subject, so we might be thoroughly convinced in our own minds, and so far as practical convince the Government, of the importance of the matter.

We spent three months on the island and made a careful survey of Pearl River Harbor and visited the other islands, and obtained the knowledge that that was the only harbor in the islands to be considered in respect to military and naval matters, and we found it to be of exceedingly great value. Its natural adaptability to naval purposes is perhaps not surpassed by any harbor in the world. In regard to its secure anchorage for large fleets, its distance from the sea makes it beyond the reach of the guns of war ships, and the great ease with which the entrance to the harbor could be defended by mounting batteries so as to make it a perfectly safe refuge for marine shipping or naval cruisers, or even a fleet which might find it necessary under any circumstances to take refuge

there; for coaling grounds, for navy-yard repair shops, storehouses, and everything of that kind.

The most important feature of all is that it economizes the naval force rather than increases it. It is capable of absolute defense by shore batteries; so a naval fleet, after going there and replenishing its supplies and making what repairs are needed, can go away and leave the harbor perfectly safe to the protection of the Army. Then arises at once the question why this harbor will be of consequence to the United States. It has not been easy to make that perfectly clear to the minds of men who have not made such subjects the study of a lifetime till now; but the conditons of the present war, it seems to me, ought to make it clear to everybody. Let us take—

Mr. CLARK. Would you rather proceed and say all you have to say and then be questioned, or do you prefer that we should put the questions as you proceed?

General SCHOFIELD. I have no objections to questions being asked as I go along.

Mr. CLARK. Does not the very fact—

Mr. NEWLANDS. Do you not think that it would make the remarks of the General more consecutive if he should be allowed to proceed without interruption?

Mr. CLARK. I asked his preference in regard to the matter.

General SCHOFIELD. It is entirely immaterial to me.

Mr. NEWLANDS. My observation is that it has always expedited a hearing of this kind.

General SCHOFIELD. It is entirely as you please. At this moment the Government is fitting out quite a large fleet of steamers at San Francisco to carry large detachments of troops and military supplies of all kinds to the Philippine Islands. Honolulu is almost in the direct route. That fleet, of course, will want very much to recoal at Honolulu, thus saving that amount of freight and tonnage for essential stores to be carried with it. Otherwise they would have to carry coal enough to carry them all the way from San Francisco to Manila and that would occupy a large amount of the carrying capacity of the fleet, and if they recoal at Honolulu all that will be saved. More than that, a fleet is liable at any time to meet with stress of weather, or perhaps a heavy storm, and there might be an accident to the machinery which will make it necessary to put into the nearest port possible for repairs and additional supplies. By the time it reaches there its coal supply might be well-nigh exhausted; it then has to replenish its coal supply to carry it to whatever port it could reach.

If I am not misinformed in regard to the laws of neutrality, the supply of coal that can be taken on board at neutral ports is only sufficient to bring it back to the nearest home port, and not enough to carry it across the ocean, so that if we had to regard Honolulu as a neutral port we could only load up coal enough to bring us back to San Francisco; and if I am misinformed in regard to that point, why, Admiral Walker will correct me. Now, let us suppose, on the other hand, that the Spanish navy in the Pacific, as well as in the Atlantic, or both, were a little stronger than ours, instead of being somewhat weaker. The first thing they would do would be to go and take possession of the Sandwich Islands and make them the basis of naval operations against the Pacific coast.

You have only to consider the state of mind which exists all along

the Atlantic coast under the erroneous apprehension that the Spanish fleet might possibly assail our coast to see what will be the case if the Spanish fleet were a good deal stronger than ours and took possession of Honolulu and made it a basis of operation in attacking the points on the Pacific coast. We would be absolutely powerless, because we would have no fleet there to dispute the possession of the Sandwich Islands, whereas, if we held that place and fortified it so that a foreign navy could not take it, it could not operate against the Pacific coast at all, for it can not bring coal enough across the Pacific Ocean to sustain an attack on the Pacific coast. Then the Sandwich Islands would be a base for naval operations, just as Puerto Rico is against the Atlantic coast. If Spain is strong enough to hold Puerto Rico, so that a squadron can replenish with supplies, coal, ammunition, and provisions there, the whole Spanish fleet can raid our Atlantic coast at will.

It happens that in this war we have picked out the only nation in the world that is a little weaker than ourselves. The Spanish fleet on the Asiatic station was the only one of all the fleets we could have overcome as we did. Of course, that can not again happen, for we will not be able to pick up so weak a fellow next time. We are liable at any time to get into a war with a nation which has a more powerful fleet than ours, and it is of vital importance, therefore, if we can, to hold the point from which they can conduct operations against our Pacific coast. Especially is that true until the Nicaragua Canal is finished, because we can not send a fleet from the Atlantic to the Pacific. We can not send them around Cape Horn and repel an attack there. If we had the canal finished, we would be very much better off than now in that respect, but even then we would want the possession of a base very much from which no power on earth except England can carry on a war against us.

They have Esquimaux and other places which would be a base of operations against us if it were possible that there could be a war between us. Still, the islands would be of very great value to them, being on a direct line of communication between Vancouver and their possessions in the southwest, but they do not need it in the sense that other nations do. Germany, France, and any of those nations would jump at the chance to get the Sandwich Islands, while they all recognize our preemption. We got a preemption title to those islands through the volunteer action of our American missionaries who went there and civilized and Christianized those people and established a Government that has no parallel in the history of the world considering its age, and we made a preemption which nobody in the world thinks of disputing, provided we perfect our title. If we do not perfect it in due time we have lost those islands. Anybody else can come in and undertake to get them.

So it seems to me the time is now ripe when this Government should do that which has been in contemplation from the beginning as a necessary consequence of the first action of our people in going there and settling those islands and establishing a good government and education and the action of our Government from that time forward on every suitable occasion in claiming the right of American influence over those islands, absolutely excluding any other foreign power from any interference, and especially as the result of the unanimous report from General Alexander and myself that steps ought to be taken in due time to secure this

harbor. We found annexation could not be talked of on account of the then existing government. We thought it wise to advise the government to take such steps as would secure for us the benefit of the use of that harbor, because that is the thing that is valuable to us; we do not care about the rest. All the rest is merely incidental to the necessity on the part of this Government to possess that harbor and to fortify it for military and naval purposes.

Of course this subject may be extended indefinitely—the value of that harbor as a place of refuge in time of war for merchant ships which might be pursued by cruisers, or a place of refuge to replenish the supplies of our own cruisers. They are of infinite value to the United States, or to any country which may oppose them in these islands for such purposes, but the great military point is the one I made twenty-five years ago, and I have not ceased to insist upon it at all proper times from that time to this, that to guard our Pacific coast against the possibility of a naval power taking possession of those islands, making them a base of operations against our Pacific coast, the one thing necessary to be done is for the United States to acquire them, improve that harbor, fortify it, and make it perfectly secure and hold it forever.

The CHAIRMAN. To acquire the whole islands?

General SCHOFIELD. To acquire so much as may be necessary for the purpose. That is a political question which I have not thought necessary to dwell upon. I do not see how you can own and command that harbor without having some claim over the islands.

Mr. NEWLANDS. You have spoken thus far of the importance of this harbor; would it be sufficient to have the harbor without the islands themselves?

General SCHOFIELD. That is the point we are just raising. That is a political question which perhaps I ought not to discuss. My own impression is we ought to have the islands for the purpose of holding the harbor; otherwise if these islands were left free and neutral to conduct their own political relations with foreign nations, we would necessarily, sooner or later, come into complications. We must either allow foreign nations to exact from them the damages which such nations are in the habit of exacting from everybody who does not regard their interests and rights—you hear every day of Great Britain and Germany sending war ships to compel people to comply with their demands. We can not guard the islands against that sort of trouble unless they belong to us. If they belong to us, we conduct the foreign relations for the islands and settle any dispute which exists with a foreign nation instead of leaving a weak little Republic to do it.

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Mr. WILLIAMS. Let us go back a moment. Suppose we owned the harbor and fortified it, with the right of sovereignty over the harbor—that is the supposition I made—and sufficient surrounding land to protect the fortifications of the harbor, which I understand we do have. Now, how could any foreign power land at the main island of Hawaii or any of the Hawaiian islands and threaten our possession of the harbor? Where would they land?

General SCHOFIELD. They could land troops anywhere at Honolulu Harbor, especially if the population were friendly to them. Suppose the Japanese, for instance, succeeded in getting that for which they are working so hard now, the political possession of the islands and physical possession—because all the emigrants

from Japan there are soldiers—in a very few years Japan can get physical and political control of the islands—

Mr. WILLIAMS. But my supposition was, if we had announced to the world our guaranty of the independence of the islands—

General SCHOFIELD. We can not do that—

Mr. WILLIAMS (continuing). And our firm determination to maintain that. If that announcement were made, do you, as a military man, think that the Japanese Empire would undertake to defy that announcement and make an attack upon those islands?

General SCHOFIELD. I do not doubt it for a moment. They would first populate the island with Japanese and get control of the Government. They would have two or three hundred thousand Japanese there thoroughly loyal to Japan—as much so as Americans are to the United States. What good would our guaranty of independence be against such a population?

Mr. WILLIAMS. You do not understand me. They might have the local government of Japanese people; I grant that.

General SCHOFIELD. Suppose those people there, in accordance with the doctrines of the American Government, were to organize a government and ask admission into the Japanese Empire. Could we resist it?

Mr. WILLIAMS. If we announced for military and naval reasons that we would guarantee the independence of those people, we would resist it to-day.

General SCHOFIELD. Our announcement would be laughed at by the governments of the world, because we have not done the things necessary to maintain that guaranty.

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Mr. NEWLANDS. You have spoken of the importance of our holding these islands with a view of preventing any other nation from taking them and making them a basis of attack upon our Pacific coast. Let me ask you whether there would be any disadvantages to our country arising from the Sandwich Islands being absolutely neutral in any war?

General SCHOFIELD. Oh, unquestionably; we would lose all the privileges we are enjoying now, the right to use them as a hospitable harbor for our own purposes. If they were to become absolutely neutral, we would not be at liberty to coal or get supplies there. The advantage to-day of the friendly attitude instead of a neutral attitude existing in the Sandwich Islands is going to be very great to us.

Mr. NEWLANDS. You think simply a neutral attitude in the Sandwich Islands would be disadvantageous to our country?

General SCHOFIELD. Yes, because other nations would enjoy just the same privileges we do.

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Mr. NEWLANDS. Do you think a greater international embarrassment would arise from a protectorate of those islands than an ownership?

General SCHOFIELD. I would not look at a protectorate. I think we should have absolute control of the foreign policy of those islands.

Mr. NEWLANDS. But with reference to international complications or embarrassments, would you regard our strongest position as one of a protectorate or annexation?

General SCHOFIELD. Annexation, by all means. I would not listen to a proposition for a protectorate at all, for the reason that you would not be able to control their foreign policy. They will

commit acts that will be regarded as objectionable by other nations, and we will have to say to a great naval power which wants to go in and enforce its terms, "No, you shall not do it."

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Mr. NEWLANDS. There is just one further question I would like to ask you. You have dwelt at great length on the advantage which the Sandwich Islands would be to a foreign country at war with us, in attacking us upon the Pacific coast. Will you state what embarrassment would arise to us from a neutral position of the Sandwich Islands in such a war?

General SCHOFIELD. They would simply deprive us of the use of those islands for military or naval purposes, and we could not have a place of refuge, for instance, for our fleet or merchant ships. A neutral port there would be of no advantage to us, and we would have great deprivation if we could control the commerce of the Pacific Ocean by our cruisers, as I presume we can. We ought to be able in any foreign war to control those islands and control the commerce of the Pacific Ocean, provided we have a depot for our cruisers to refit and resupply themselves, etc. In other words, for the purpose of military control of commerce we want very much that depot.

Mr. NEWLANDS. An objection urged to the acquisition of these islands is that it would very largely increase the Navy?

General SCHOFIELD. That is absolutely untrue. It is the reverse of the fact, as it would have the tendency to diminish the Navy in the Pacific because of the control of these islands.

Mr. NEWLANDS. Would the military expense be large in fortifying those islands?

General SCHOFIELD. No, sir; compared with the general expenses of the Army and Navy of the United States.

Mr. NEWLANDS. From an economical point of view, in a war, would you regard the holding of these islands as an advantage?

General SCHOFIELD. Oh, very great, very great. It would cost us very much less to carry on war in the Pacific Ocean if we hold these islands than if we did not have them. The difference would be far greater than any possible cost of holding and fortifying them.

Mr. ADAMS. Has any estimate been made of the probable expense of fortifying Pearl Harbor?

General SCHOFIELD. No. I would rather leave that to the engineers; but it is not very great, a few hundred thousand dollars, perhaps. It is peculiarly easy to fortify. You only have to have fortifications on each side of this comparatively narrow channel.

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Mr. WILLIAMS. If we were strong enough to hold the islands and prevent a successful attack by any power, would not we be strong enough to defend our Government from the same power?

General SCHOFIELD. I think that does not follow at all. The holding of the islands so that a foreign navy can not get possession of them absolutely paralyzes that navy as against the Pacific coast, so that the problem of war would be reduced to holding the islands instead of defending the whole line of the Pacific coast.

Mr. WILLIAMS. I will put the question in another shape. If we owned those islands our holding them for any great length of time would depend upon our sea power?

General SCHOFIELD. Yes; we can not hold anything without sea power.

Mr. WILLIAMS. It would necessarily come down to the question of sea power after all. If our sea power was sufficient to hold them, then our sea power would be sufficient to protect ourselves from the naval attacks of an enemy?

General SCHOFIELD. I beg your pardon. The difference is this: The holding of the islands—if we have possession and fortify them, our sea power would be reinforced by enormous land power there. In other words, an enemy, in order to get a basis from which to attack us at all, either on sea or shore, would have to come to those islands there—they would have to attack the perfected modern fortifications.

Mr. WILLIAMS. Do you presuppose the population of the islands friendly to us or unfriendly?

General SCHOFIELD. I suppose them to be friendly, and that they would therefore assist us in their defense.

Mr. WILLIAMS. That, I say, is predicated largely upon the assumption that they will be friendly?

General SCHOFIELD. Yes; and that is the great value of annexation as compared with neutrality or something worse.

STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN G. WALKER, UNITED STATES NAVY.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Walker, the gentlemen of the committee have requested you to be present that they may have the aid of your views and information as a seaman touching the question involved in the resolution before them providing for the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, and we will be glad to have you state your views in such manner as may suit you.

Admiral WALKER. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, it seems to me that General Schofield has covered the general ground very well, and perhaps it would be better for members of the committee to ask me any questions they please at once. I agree with General Schofield entirely in his general statement of the value of the islands to the United States.

Mr. DINSMORE. Then, if I may be permitted, I would like to ask the Admiral especially to explain to the committee—it may be others understand it, but I would like to have him explain to us the situation there from a military standpoint, and what would have to be done in case we take possession of the islands; what fortifications and what works we would have to construct, and what force he thinks would be sufficient to be placed there.

Admiral WALKER. Pearl Harbor is now a large lagoon, practically surrounded by land. There is a narrow entrance, and outside of this entrance a coral reef extends around the island outside of this lagoon and makes a bar, preventing a vessel entering the harbor which draws over 10 or 12 feet of water, I can not say exactly. I was out there in 1894, and I took up the idea that there must be a break in that coral reef somewhere, which, if found, probably an entrance could be easily made, and I was led to that belief from the fact that they had deepened the entrance to Honolulu Harbor quite easily. I put a party of officers and men at work, and they were seven weeks on that bar. They examined the bar very carefully and found exactly what I expected they would find, a fissure in the reef, which was filled with fine coral sand—disintegrated coral. They bored it out, inside and outside, to determine its width.

We found we could come down without the slightest trouble as deep as we wanted to go; but this is fine sand, which can be

sucked off with a suction dredge with the greatest ease. That entrance through the reef was in its narrowest part about 500 feet, as I recollect. When that should be opened, which could be done at small expense, it would leave an entrance varying, say, from 800 or 1,000 feet to 500, every inch of which would be covered by the guns placed in the fortifications on the beach; and it would not be a straight channel; it would be a curved channel, and by means of mines and a few guns on the beach all the navies in the world could be stopped from entering in there.

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Mr. NEWLANDS. How large is that lagoon inside the coral reef?

Admiral WALKER. It is very large, and cut up by points and islands so it is very smooth water, always as smooth as the water of the Potomac here, and it is entirely secure as an anchorage. There is plenty of depth of water.

Mr. WILLIAMS. How deep is it?

Admiral WALKER. You could always get 6, 7, or 8 fathoms of water; all the water a ship wants.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state the comparative value of the Sandwich Islands as a point compared to any other islands which lie in the Pacific Ocean near to or far from our Pacific coast?

Admiral WALKER. I consider the Sandwich Islands worth far more than all the others put together. The Sandwich Islands, if occupied by an enemy with a fleet, would be a thorn in our side.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the isolation of the Sandwich Islands from any near neighbor which contributes to its importance?

Admiral WALKER. That contributes to its importance, of course. There is no other in the North Pacific that would be of use. When I speak of the North Pacific, I speak of the American side. There is nothing of any use except the Sandwich Islands.

Mr. COUSINS. How much would it cost to make the Sandwich Islands impregnable to a fleet such as composes a first-class power now?

Admiral WALKER. It is not at all probable that any power would send a very heavy fleet out there, as it is a long way from Europe.

Mr. COUSINS. It is presumed that would be their business to send one there. How much would it cost to fortify this harbor?

Admiral WALKER. That is a question I could not answer. It would not be very heavy of making fortifications for Pearl Harbor so it could not be taken at all, and the only other secure landing place would be at Honolulu, which is from 7 to 10 miles away, and it is perfectly easy to fortify that sufficiently to prevent anybody from landing there.

Mr. BERRY. It would cost less than to build a battle ship now?

Admiral WALKER. Yes.

Mr. PEARSON. I suppose half a million to deepen it and half a million more to build fortifications?

Admiral WALKER. I can not speak as an engineer as to the fortifications. I should think a half million would put up all the fortifications we would want there.

Mr. NEWLANDS. Suppose in this war the Spanish Government had a navy equal to or perhaps superior to ours and should take possession of the Hawaiian Islands and menace us from that point by offensive warfare against the Pacific coast. How would they make that warfare effective as against our commerce on that coast, and what precautions would we have to adopt to meet it?

Admiral WALKER. Without the Sandwich Islands they could not operate successfully against our coast at all, because the question of neutrality would cut them off from both the British dominions north of us and Mexico south of us; but with the Sandwich Islands in their possession they could establish a depot of coal and supplies at the Sandwich Islands, and ships would pass backward and forward as they pleased.

Mr. NEWLANDS. Would it prove very destructive to our commercial marine in that case?

Admiral WALKER. If they had force enough. If they were superior to us in force, why they would wipe out the merchant marine from the Pacific coast entirely.

Mr. NEWLANDS. What precautions would we have to adopt in order to meet that?

Admiral WALKER. We would need a very much larger navy than we would otherwise need on that coast.

Mr. NEWLANDS. We would need a navy to protect our coast; that would be required along the entire line of our coast, as well as Alaska?

Admiral WALKER. Yes; we would need a greater number of fortifications; we would need fortified places that perhaps would not be fortified otherwise.

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Mr. NEWLANDS. But I am putting a supposed case that their navy was equal or perhaps superior to ours, and I want to ask what precautions we would have to take in order to meet an offensive warfare waged upon that coast. Now, for instance, we have these vessels leaving Alaska just about this time with gold for San Francisco.

Admiral WALKER. They would have to be convoyed in force sufficient to secure safety.

Mr. NEWLANDS. By United States vessels?

Admiral WALKER. By vessels of war.

Mr. NEWLANDS. And you say additional fortifications would be required on the Pacific coast?

Admiral WALKER. Otherwise the Spaniards could land where they pleased out of the range of fortifications. Of course, the coast of California is a long coast, and it could be raided like any other coast.

Mr. NEWLANDS. So we would have to increase not only the military expense, but the naval expense, in order to protect that coast?

Admiral WALKER. Yes.

Mr. NEWLANDS. You say they could not operate far—

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Admiral WALKER. Not unless they had a base.

Mr. NEWLANDS. Is there any island on the Atlantic Ocean so important on the Atlantic coast as those islands are on the Pacific coast?

Admiral WALKER. No; I do not think so.

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Mr. ADAMS. In your judgment it would cost less and take fewer troops to protect the Pacific coast with the possession of the Hawaiian Islands than without them?

Admiral WALKER. Yes.

Mr. ADAMS. Because, to my mind, that is the great economic point of the whole question.



Admiral WALKER. I suppose we could take the Hawaiian Islands and fortify them for less money than it would take to build one battle ship.

Mr. COUSINS. Suppose you have the Hawaiian Islands thoroughly fortified so they are impregnable so far as any fleet is concerned owned by any other power, and the inhabitants thereof should become suddenly dissatisfied with the government that then existed and they should take charge of these fortifications, how would you get them?

Admiral WALKER. I take it for granted that we should have garrisons in those fortifications—a small garrison—and, knowing the people of the Hawaiian Islands as well as I do, I have not the slightest idea they would ever become dissatisfied to any such extent as that.

Mr. COUSINS. Are you pretty well acquainted with the inhabitants of Hawaii?

Admiral WALKER. I have been out there at different periods. I was out there forty-five years ago, and I was out there four years ago.

Mr. NEWLANDS. You do not think the people of those islands would regard this as an oppressive Government?

Admiral WALKER. No.

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
Mr. WILLIAMS. I understood you to say in your opinion we would require a less navy for the defense of the Pacific coast or on the Pacific seas if we owned Hawaii than if we did not. If we owned Hawaii, would not we bring ourselves nearer the point of attack instead of removing ourselves farther from one?

Admiral WALKER. I do not think so.

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